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COMMENT
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
By FRANK S. SEIDERS, JR.*

In two recent cases before the United States Supreme Court, Abbate v.
United States' and Bartkus v. Illinois 2, the problem of whether or not a defendant could be tried for the same offense in a state court and a federal court
arose. In each of these cases, of course, the defendant took the position that
such a procedure placed him in double jeopardy. The court in each case disagreed and decided that this was not repugnant to the Constitution.
Despite the fact that these cases received wide publicity, the problem is
by no means a new one. As early as 1820 in Houston v. Moore ' this question
was acknowledged. In that case, which involved a militia-man who refused
to serve when called upon by the President of the United States, the issue arose
as to whether or not the delinquent soldier could be made to face a state courtmartial. In effect, he was contending -that his offense was a federal one. The
Court, speaking through Justice Washington, on the question of the state's
jurisdiction said:
"It was contended, that if the exercise of this jurisdiction, be admitted,
that the sentence of the court would either oust the jurisdiction of the United
States Court-martial or might subject the accused to be twice tried for the
same offense. To this I answer, that, if the jurisdiction of the two courts be
concurrent, the sentence of either court, either of conviction or acquittal,
might be pleaded in bar of the prosecution before the other.....
From this brief statement it appears that the Court was aware of this
problem and appeared to be on the threshhold of the theory that, while there
may be concurrent jurisdiction over a single act, only one conviction or acquittal therefore was possible. This theory, however, was discarded twenty-seven
years later, in 1847, in Fox v. Ohio,' where it was held that a single act could
be an offense against two sovereigns, the United States and the state. This
doctrine was followed in two cases which were heard soon after the Fox case:
* A.B., Dickinson College, L.L.B., Dickinson School of Law. Member of Dauphin County Bar.
Associate in the firm of Hanson & Hanson, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.
179 Sup. Ct. 666 (1959).
2 79 Sup. Ct. 676 (1959).
a 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820).
446 U.S. (5 How.) 410 (1847).

[ 3551

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

(VOL. 63

United States v. Marigold' and Moore v. The People.' In these three cases the
concept of one act being two wrongs had its beginnings.
In all three of the foregoing cases the Court was careful to point out that
the same crime was not being punished twice. The position of the Court was
that the single act constituted two entirely separate offenses. In the Fox case,
which involved the passing of counterfeit coins, the following statement was
made in the majority opinion: '
"The punishment of a cheat or a misdemeanor practiced within the state,
and against those whom she is bound to protect, is peculiarly and appropriately
within her functions and duties, and it is difficult to imagine an interference
with those duties and functions which would be regular or justifiable."
The Court went on to conclude that it was possible for the state to punish
the fraud occasioned by passing base coin and the United States could punish
the counterfeiting thereof.
Similar conclusions were reached in both the Marigold 8 and Moore
cases. However, the Court was not unanimous in reaching these opinions.
Justice McLean in a vigorous dissenting opinion in the Moore case made this
observation:
"It is contrary to the nature and genius of our government, to punish an
individual twice for the same offense. Where the jurisdiction is clearly vested
in the federal government, and an adequate punishment has been provided by
it for an offense, no state, it appears to me, can punish the same act. The as-

sertion of such a power involves the right of a state to punish all offenses
punishable under the Acts of Congress.

This would practically disregard, if

it did not destroy, this important branch of criminal justice, clearly vested in
the federal government. . . . It is no satisfactory answer to this, to say
that the States and federal government constitute different sovereignties, and
consequently may each punish offenders under its own laws." 10
Eventually, in the case of the United States v. Lanza, all of these cases
were cited by Chief Justice Taft in support of the proposition that a single act
could simultaneously be two wrongs, each of which is punishable. The reasoning of the Chief Justice is best summed up from this quote:
"It follows that an act denounced as a crime by both national and state
sovereignties is an offense against the peace and dignity of both and may be
550 U.S. (9 How.) 560 (1850).
655 U.S. (14 How.) 13 (1852).
7 See note 4 supra, opinion by Justice Daniel.
the same act might, as to
8 See note 5 supra. In the Marigold case Justice Daniel said: "...
its character and tendencies, and the consequences it involved, constitute an offense against both the
State and federal governments, and might draw to its commission the penalties denounced by either,
as appropriate to its character in reference to each."
9 See note 6 supra.
10 See note 6 supra at 21. Justice McLean also disagreed with ,the result in the Fox case and
dissented therein.
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punished by each. . . . The defendents thus committed two different offenses by the same act, and a conviction by a court of Washington against that
state is not a conviction of the different offense against the United States, and
so is not double jeopardy.""
The case went on to quote from Southern Railway Company v. R. R. Commission of Indiana 12 establishing that the jurisdiction of one sovereign shall
not preclude that of the other. This seems to completely destroy the theory
of the Houston Case "3that a proceeding in one jurisdiction is a bar to prosecution in the other.1"
In one of the cases under consideration in this note, 'Abbate v. United
States, 5 it is interesting to observe that the Court felt that they were being
asked to overrule the preceding Lanza case. This they declined to do, Justice
Brennan reasoning that:
"Petitioner asks us to overrule Lanza. We decline to do so. No considerations or persuasive reasons not presented to the Court in the prior cases
are advanced why we should depart from its firmly established principle.
On the contrary, undesirable consequences would follow if Lanza were overruled . . . if the States are free to prosecute criminal acts violating their
laws, and the resultant state prosecutions bar federal prosecutions based on
the same acts, federal law enforcement must necessarily be hindered." 16
Bartkus v. Illinois 17 also put considerable emphasis on the Lanza case."

There is one very noteworthy distinction between the Abbate and the Bartkus cases.

The latter involved a state trial after a federal acquittal for the

same acts; the former involved a federal conviction subsequent to a state conviction. Although not within the scope of this note, it is interesting to observe
that this creates an odd situation in Pennsylvania where, as a general principle,
the Commonwealth is not allowed to appeal acquittals. This then creates the
1 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922).
236 U.S. 439 (1915).
is See note 3 supra.
14 In the Southern Railway case Justice Laman made this observation: "This concurrent jurisdiction may be either because the nature of the act is such that at the same time it produces
effects respectively within the sphere of state and federal regulations and thus violates the laws
of both, or where there is this double effect in a matter of which one can exercise control, but an
authoritative declaration that the paramount jurisdiction of one shall not exclude that of the other."
Chief Justice Taft included this quotation in his opinion in the Lanza case, 260 U.S. 384.
15 See note 1 supra.
179 S. Ct. at 670, 671.
17 See note 2 supra.
18 Justice Frankfurter said: "While United States v. Lanza ...
was the first case in which
we squarely held valid a federal prosecution arising out of the same facts which had been the basis
of a state conviction, the validity of such a prosecution by the Federal Government has not been
questioned by this Court since the opinion in Fox v. State of Ohio . . . more than one hundred
years ago." 79 S. Ct. 676, 681. Justice Frankfurter goes into an exhaustive study of the historical
ackground of this theory.
12
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anomaly that the state cannot appeal, but if a federal offense can be discovered, the offender can still be convicted, even after a prior acquittal in the state.
In both of the cases being examined in this note, Chief Justice Warren
and Justices Black and Douglas dissented from the opinion of .the majority of
the Court.1" Their reasoning was somewhat akin to that of Justice McLean in
the Fox case more than a century before, i.e., to try one twice on the same facts
is repugnant to the constitutional guarantees against double jeopardy. In the
Bartkus case, the dissenting opinion vigorously attacks the possibility of a federal conviction after a state acquittal in these words:
"The Court's holding further limits our already weakened constitutional
guarantees against double prosecutions.

United States v. Lanza . . . allowed

federal conviction and punishment of a man who had been previously convicted
and punished for the identical acts by one of our states. Today, for the first
time in its history, this Court upholds the state conviction of a defendent
who had been acquitted of the same offense in the federal courts. I would

hold that a federal trial following either state acquittal or conviction is barred
by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

.

.

.

I think

double prosecutions for the same offense are so contrary to the the spirit of
our free country that they violate even the prevailing view of the Fourteenth
,20
Amendment..

The dissent in the Abbate case advanced the proposition that it is absurd
to let the two sovereigns do together what neither could do separately.2
In conclusion, the Supreme Court has clearly affirmed its position that a
person may be tried twice for the same act but only for different offenses in a
state and a federal court. This is true irrespective of whether the first trial
results in a conviction or an acquittal. The decisions are far from unanimous,
however, and the argument of the dissenters is best summed up in this quotation:
"The Court apparently takes the position that a second trial for the same
act is somehow less offensive if one of the trials is conducted by the Federal
Government and the other by a State. Looked at from the standpoint of
the individual who is being prosecuted, this notion is too subtle for me to
grasp. If double punishment is what is feared, it hurts no less for two "Sovereigns" to inflict it than for one. If danger to the innocent is emphasized,
that danger is surely no less when the power of State and Federal Governments
is brought to bear on one man in two trials, than when one of these "Sovereigns"
proceeds alone. In each case, inescapably, a man is forced to face danger
twice for the same conduct." 22
19 In both
2079
21 Justice

instances Mr. Justice Black wrote the dissenting opinion.

S. Ct. 676, 695 (1959).

Black said: "I am also not convinced that a state and the Nation can be considered
two wholly separate sovereignties for the purpose of allowing them to do together what, generally,
neither can do separately." 79 S. Ct. 666, 675 (1959).
22 Justice Black's dissent in Bartkus v. Illinois. See note 2 supra.

